United Nation’s Estranged Role In Kashmir

The UN has been a ghastly nearness in Kashmir struggle from the beginning. Observing once again the war zones of 1948 and expediting a delicate peace. Over the most recent couple of decades it has withdrawn consistently away from plain sight as its own significance as a peace keeping body started to blur.

For a considerable length of time the UN military spectator’s office lay overlooked in Srinagar’s rich political locale a relic from another period. In any case amid late uprisings softened out up the Valley it has all of a sudden turned into a question of intrigue.

The separatist authority under SAS Geelani commonly issued “UN chalo” calls, requesting that individuals walk to the workplace. Kashmiri standard government officials like the Awami Ittehad Party’s Engineer Rashid were not to be abandoned. Rashid was confined ordinarily as he attempted to hold a rally headed towards the workplace requesting change for human rights infringement and the plebiscite guaranteed in Resolution 47 of the UN.

Over the most recent couple of years the plebiscite determination has been summoned by various gatherings going from officials like Rashid to the Hurriyat initiative. Kashmir’s standard gatherings that take an interest in discretionary legislative issues don’t summon the UN. Socialist Party of India (Marxist’s) Mohammad Yousuf Tarigami rejects the UN as an applicable gathering for tackling the issue. Thus far as the national administration is concerned Kashmir is none of the UN’s business cross-outskirt fear based oppression is.

The UN Security Council embraced the first of its resolutions in January 1948. Battling had broken out months back. Incensed transactions between Jawaharlal Nehru, Pakistan Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and their British middle men had neglected to yield a concurrence on a plebiscite or a truce. In his book, ‘War and Peace’ in Modern India, Srinath Raghavan depicts how Nehru who had at first opposed taking the issue to the UN chose to approach the global body in a diplomatic way.

It was alluded under Article 35 of the UN contract which enables any part to bring a debate or circumstance that is probably going to make universal grating the notice of the Security Council. India grumbled that, “Pakistani nationals and tribesmen” had entered the territory of Jammu and Kashmir Raghavan says. Pakistan denied the charges. Rather it claimed that India had achieved the promotion of Kashmir through “extortion and savagery” built a “genocide” of Muslims and was liable of animosities in Junagarh. Being close associates of Pakistan, Kashmir always want to be the part of Pakistan.

Determination 38 of January 17 chose that the leader of the Security Council should welcome delegates of India and Pakistan to participate in coordinate talks.

Determination 39 received on January 20, 1948 set up the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan which was to do examinations in the contention zone and intercede between the two warring forces.

The Security Council’s state of mind towards Kashmir was to a great extent formed by the British assignment drove by the Commonwealth secretary Philip Noel-Baker, Raghavan calls attention to.

Noel-Baker trusted that Britain had officially estranged the Arabs on the subject of Palestine and Israel and the last may be additionally excited if Britain wobbled on Kashmir. “It was critical to evade the risk of threatening the entire of Islam by seeming to agree with India against Pakistan” as he expressed on record.

Other than Noel-Baker additionally trusted that, since it contained a larger part of Muslims Kashmir appropriately had a place with Pakistan. Subsequently the British assignment forgot about India’s protest and affirmed that battling could just stop if courses of action for a reasonable plebiscite were come to.

Nehru presumed that the UK and the US had “assumed a messy part”. The Security Council passed Resolution 47 on April 21, 1948, “Nothing with fulfillment that the two India and Pakistan want that the topic of the increase of Jammu and Kashmir ought to be chosen through the vote based technique for a free and fair plebiscite.”

In the months paving the way to the determination Raghavan says, Sheik Abdullah at that point heading the crisis organisation in the state had drifted the possibility of a free Kashmir. Abdullah had dependably been against the possibility of a plebiscite which would just permit the province of Jammu and Kashmir to pick amongst India and Pakistan.

Canada as a part condition of the UN had even recommended that the plebiscite incorporate a third alternative and Nehru had carefully consented to put it crosswise over to his administration. “The arrangement was suppressed by the British” Raghavan says. They stressed that it could turn into the reason for new wrangles amongst India and Pakistan also prolific region for Russian interest.

Determination 47 extended the UNCIP from three part states to five. Second it gave directions for the rebuilding of peace. Pakistan was to pull back “from the territory of Jammu and Kashmir tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not ordinarily inhabitant in that and who had entered the State with the end goal of battling”. Once that procedure was in progress India was proportional back its military nearness to the “base quality required for the help of common power in the support of lawfulness” and to send these troops without scaring the nearby populace.

Third, it accommodated the formation of a Plebiscite Administration which would manage an unprejudiced submission. Fourth it taught the two nations to discharge political detainees guarantee the recovery of uprooted populaces and secure minorities.

Be that as it may Resolution 47, go under Chapter VI of the UN contract was not authoritative or enforceable not at all like those go under Chapter VII.

More resolutions took after that year in June, August and November. The determination UN commission of August 13,1948 laid out the terms of a detente and a truce. By then as indicated by Raghavan the Pakistan remote pastor had uncovered that Pakistani troops were really battling in favour of Kashmir. What’s more a rankled Indian administration was in no inclination for concessions?

So the determination directed that Pakistan would be the first to leave, and the emptied territory would be controlled for now by “nearby experts under the reconnaissance of the commission”. This was the time where Kashmir should ask for their choice however when India was told that Pakistan had pulled back it would downsize its own military sending in stages. After the detente the two gatherings would counsel the commission for a determination of the issue as per the will of the Kashmiri individuals. Which didn’t happen in history.

The truce became effective in January 1949, however the truce line was not drawn up until the Karachi Agreement a half year later. It partitioned Kashmir amongst India and Pakistan, with military eyewitnesses positioned at the outskirts to manage the truce line. The following decade would be spent attempting to work out a sturdy equation for disarmament and a plebiscite.

In 1950, the Security Council selected Sir Owen Dixon a judge in the Australian high court as UN delegate to India and Pakistan. His report, submitted to the Security Council that September laid out the “Dixon Plan” which doled out Pakistan-involved Kashmir and the Northern Areas to Pakistan, Ladakh to India, split Jammu between the two and prescribed a plebiscite for the Valley. Be that as it may it additionally noticed that India and Pakistan couldn’t concur on the conditions fundamental for a plebiscite or the procedure of disarmament.

The report was ordered amid periods of raising pressures as Pakistan became unsettled about the moderate advance on a determination for Kashmir. As talk of a “sacred war” to free Kashmir became louder in Pakistan and a rash of viciousness softened out up the Valley, India chose to assemble troops along its wildernesses with Pakistan. As war appeared to be inescapable discretionary endeavors developed more exceptional.

Determination 91, received by the Security Council in March 1951, called for assertion on the off chance that neutralization did not occur inside three months. Second, the Commission was eliminated to offer path to the UN Military Observers Group for India and Pakistan. Be that as it may the UNMOGIP could just examine protestations of truce infringement and present its answer to either party or to the UN secretary general. Third, the determination observed the new constituent gathering for Jammu and Kashmir chose before that year. In any case these decisions were not viewed as a substitute for plebiscite. India dismissed the determination.

By the time Frank Graham was designated as the new arbiter as Dixon had surrendered in lose hope. AG Noorani writing in 2002, noticed that the Dixon Plan was the main recipe which met with Nehru’s endorsement. The six reports accumulated by Graham he says, “Reflect inadequacy and an enthusiasm for survival”. His successor Gunnar Jarring delegated in 1957 was plain “dreamer”.

When new threats softened out up 1965, UN determination on the “India-Pakistan Question” had developed considerably less nitty gritty and significantly more sad. In September that year the Security Council passed three resolutions requiring a conclusion to the contention and begging the two governments to participate with the UN military eyewitnesses.

Determination 211 required an unequivocal truce that happened from September 22. The two nations concurred, Pakistan more reluctantly than India. The Tashkent Agreement marked in 1966 under the joint protection of the UN the United States and Soviet Union stated, that the two nations would surrender vanquished districts and withdraw to the truce line of 1949.

That kept going until the point that the Bangladesh war of 1971, when Indian and Pakistani strengths secured battle on both the eastern and western fronts. When the Security Council passed Resolution 307 on December 21,1971 the Pakistani Army had just surrendered in the East and India had announced a one-sided. Ultimately Kashmir is suffering but live with the hope “to be the part of Pakistan.”

The question now arises that Is the resolution of Kashmir Issue or some might call it Kashmir cause; Is it possible? Are both sides willing to seriously sit and negotiate on it when political leaders and military commands on both sides keep lingering the issues and facts to outside world for their self-political and strategic interests The atrocities within Kashmir valley are somehow inaccessible to the outside world In August, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein expressed regret at the failure of Indian and Pakistani authorities to grant his office access to Jammu and Kashmir for a fact-finding visit. “Without access, we can only fear the worst,” he said.

The solution to Kashmir cause is inevitable within guidelines and framework of United Nations Charter which is founded on principals to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war yet the role of UN in resolving crisis is emulsified. The UN must perceive Kashmir Issue as its top priority and bring both parties to conflict resolutions mechanism.


Roshan Akbar (Phd. Candidate at University of Warsaw, Poland)

Yasir Aziz (M.A. Political Science & International Relations studies at University of Warsaw, Poland)

Note: It is not necessary for OT to agree or disagree with the writer’s opinion. 

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